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CASE NOTE
TORT LAW—Overruled! Wyoming’s Novel Interpretation of the
Wrongful Death Act’s Personal Representative; In re Estate of Johnson,
231 P.3d 873 (Wyo. 2010)
Dustin Joseph Richards*
Introduction
Wyoming’s Wrongful Death Act (Act), as old as the state itself, requires
a personal representative to bring a wrongful death action.1 However, the Act
never expressly defines the term “personal representative” or specifies where to
find a definition.2 Courts and practitioners therefore have looked to Wyoming’s
Probate Code to fill this legislative gap and provide the definition of and process
for appointing the personal representative.3 Potential personal representatives
simply petition probate courts for appointment pursuant to the well-developed
process provided by the Probate Code and then bring a wrongful death action as a
civil matter.4

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2012. Many thanks to Professor Bridgeman,
Professor Delaney, and the editors of the Wyoming Law Review for your insightful comments
and guidance. Special thanks to my family and friends for your continued support and patience
throughout this process.
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(a) (2010) (“Every [wrongful death] action shall be
brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person.”); 1871 Wyo.
Sess. Laws 89 (“Every [wrongful death] action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal
representative of such deceased person.”); Ashley v. Read Const. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 728 (D.
Wyo. 1961) (“[O]nly the personal representative of the decedent may bring an action for her death
caused by the wrongful act of another.”); Tuttle v. Short, 288 P. 524, 529 (Wyo. 1930) (“Under the
Wyoming statutes it is plain that an action for death by wrongful act can be brought only by and
in the name of the personal representative.”). Wyoming enacted its initial wrongful death statutes
while it was a territory, nineteen years before becoming a state. See Debora A. Person, Wyoming
Pre-Statehood Legal Materials: An Annotated Bibliography, 7 Wyo. L. Rev. 50, 60 (2007) (describing
how Wyoming became a state in 1890).
1

2
Grant Harvey Lawson, Comment, Reconciling the Wyoming Wrongful Death Act with
the Wyoming Probate Code: The Legislature’s Wake-up Call for Clarification, 7 Wyo. L. Rev. 409,
415 (2007).

See In re Estate of Johnson, 231 P.3d 873, 882 (Wyo. 2010) (Hill, J., dissenting) (“For
so long as the wrongful death statute has existed in this state, there can be no legitimate doubt or
ambiguity, whatsoever, that by its use of the phrase ‘personal representative,’ the legislature intended
that it have the same meaning as that expressed in [the probate code].”); infra notes 13–24 and
accompanying text (discussing the history of Wyoming wrongful death cases which incorporated
the Probate Code in defining the personal representative).
3

See Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 42 (Wyo. 1975) (“The designation of an
administrator is no more than a statutory device to provide a party for a civil action to collect
damages and pay them over to the persons entitled.”), overruled by Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d
4
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However, in deciding In re Estate of Johnson, the Wyoming Supreme
Court overruled Bircher v. Foster with the result that this predictable, reliable
interpretation of the Act no longer applies.5 This case involved a dispute between
Larry Johnson’s surviving wife and his father as to who should bring an action
for his wrongful death.6 Since his father submitted the initial petition for
appointment as a probate action and the Probate Code grants a surviving spouse
highest preference, the court should have appointed Larry Johnson’s wife as his
personal representative.7 This case note argues the Probate Code should control
the appointment of a personal representative in a wrongful death action as the
legislature intended because the Probate Code provides predictability through its
structure and comports with a long history of Wyoming case law.8
This case note begins by outlining the development and current state of
Wyoming’s Wrongful Death Act.9 In addition, this case note traces the period of
legislative activity in the late 1970s and early 1980s from the Act’s relocation to
the Probate Code and subsequent return to the Civil Code.10 This case note then
surveys previous wrongful death cases in Wyoming supporting the contention
that courts appointing the wrongful death action’s “personal representative”
should follow the Probate Code.11 By analyzing the plain language of the Act,
examining legislative history, reviewing Wyoming case law, and understanding
other states’ wrongful death actions, this case note asserts the Johnson court should
have required the lower court to follow the Probate Code in appointing a personal
representative in a wrongful death action.12

1055 (Wyo. 1984), as recognized in Johnson, 231 P.3d at 879; Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901, 903
(Wyo. 1963) (“[T]here is no authority in this State either by statute or decision whereby a district
court, unless sitting in probate, would be authorized to appoint . . . the personal representative . . .
for the purposes of a death action.”), overruled by Johnson, 231 P.3d at 879; infra notes 37–42 and
accompanying text (explaining Wyoming’s Probate Code).
See Johnson, 231 P.3d at 879 (majority opinion) (“Bircher is overruled prospectively to the
extent that it requires a wrongful death action to be brought in probate court, and to the extent
that it requires a wrongful death personal representative to be the administrator or executor of the
decedent’s estate in probate.”); supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
5

6

Johnson, 231 P.3d at 875.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-201(a) (2010) (“The relatives of the deceased . . . are entitled
to administer in the following order: i) The surviving husband or wife; ii) The children; iii) The
father or mother.”); Petition for Appointment of Personal Representative for Purposes of a Wrongful
Death Action Pursuant to W.S. § 1-38-102 at 1, In re Estate of Johnson, Probate No. 08-43 (Uinta
Cnty. Dist. Ct. Sep. 18, 2008).
7

8
See Lawson, supra note 2, at 419 (“Without a clear definition of ‘personal representative’
located in the Wrongful Death Act or elsewhere in the Civil Code, it appears that presently the only
option is to refer to the Probate Code.”); infra notes 119–71 and accompanying text.
9

See infra notes 13–42 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 25–36 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 43–66 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 119–71 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss1/8

2

Richards: Tort Law - Overruled - Wyoming's Novel Interpretation of the Wron

2011

Case Note

243

Background
Wyoming’s Wrongful Death Act
Originally, under common law, an individual could not bring a civil action
against someone for causing the death of another.13 By passing Lord Campbell’s
Act in 1846, the English Parliament created the first action to benefit people
injured by the wrongful death of a relative.14 This created a statutory right for
someone injured by the wrongful death of another to bring a civil action against
an individual responsible for that death.15 Many United States jurisdictions
followed suit, enacting similarly-worded statutes based on the English Act.16 To
this day, many states’ wrongful death statutes share similar language, terms, and
phrasing—evidencing their common origin.17 In 1871, and while still a territory,
Wyoming patterned its Wrongful Death Act after West Virginia’s statute, which
was similar to Lord Campbell’s Act.18
Wyoming’s first Wrongful Death Act stated:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act . . . the person who . . . would have been liable if death had
not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages . . . .
Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the
personal representative of such deceased person.19

13
12 Am. Jur. Trials 317 § 2 (2010); Lawson, supra note 2, at 413 (citing Tuttle v. Short, 288
P. 524, 529 (Wyo. 1930)).
14
22A Am. Jur. 2d Death § 4 (2010); Thomas M. Cooley, The Elements of Torts 93
(1895). Massachusetts passed a statute related to wrongful death six years before Lord Campbell’s
Act, but it only provided a “quasi-criminal remedy,” not a right to bring a civil action. John
Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, the Origins of
Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 717,
733–34 (2000).
15

12 Am. Jur. Trials 317 § 2 (2010).

22A Am. Jur. 2d Death § 4 (2010); Cooley, supra note 14, at 93 (“Most of the legislation
in America on the subject is modeled after [Lord Campbell’s] [A]ct.”); Francis B. Tiffany, Death
by Wrongful Act 5, 21 (1893) (“[Lord Campbell’s Act] has served as the model for similar acts in
most of the states in this country.”). For a detailed discussion on the early development of wrongful
death in the United States, see generally Stuart M. Speiser et al., Recovery for Wrongful Death
(3d ed. 1992).
16

See 22A Am. Jur. 2d Death § 4 (2010) (noting Lord Campbell’s Act was closely followed
by many wrongful death statutes in the United States).
17

See Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 441 (Wyo. 1998) (“The [Wrongful Death] [A]ct
was similar to Lord Campbell’s Act and was almost an exact copy of West Virginia’s wrongful death
law.”); Lawson, supra note 2, at 413–14 (discussing the origins of Wyoming’s Wrongful Death Act).
18

1871 Wyo. Sess. Laws 88–89 (emphasis added). Since enacting the statutes, the legislature
has only modified this provision by replacing the phrase “such deceased person” with “the deceased
person.” Compare Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(a) (2010) (“Every such action shall be brought by
19
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While the Act has never explicitly defined or provided criteria for the appointment
of the personal representative, the original Act expressly incorporated the Probate
Code by distributing the proceeds of a wrongful death action according to
the Probate Code’s intestate succession provision.20 Since 1871, the Wyoming
State Legislature substantially modified the Act’s wording four times, each time
changing who can benefit from the action or how to determine and award the
proceeds.21 These changes resulted in a more expansive distribution of damages,
allowing any potential beneficiary the opportunity to prove damages before a court
or jury.22 The legislature also protected the proceeds of a wrongful death action
from being used to satisfy any debt of the deceased.23 While these modifications
removed express incorporations of the Probate Code, the legislature preserved the
original language identifying the personal representative as the sole party to bring
a wrongful death action, without further clarification.24

Legislative Confusion
A period of legislation in the late 1970s and early 1980s created a confusing
record but illustrates the legislature’s understanding that the Wrongful Death Act
relates to the Probate Code.25 This examination serves to diminish the importance
the Johnson majority conferred on the placement of the Act outside the Probate

and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person.” (emphasis added)), with
1871 Wyo. Sess. Laws 89 (“Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal
representative of such deceased person.” (emphasis added)).
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102; 1871 Wyo. Sess. Laws 89; see also In re Estate of Johnson,
231 P.3d 873, 879 n.1 (Wyo. 2010) (“In 1963, when Bircher issued, there was a connection within
the wrongful death act to the intestacy statutes.”). Specifically, the Act stated: “[T]he amount
recovered in every such action shall be distributed to the parties and in the proportions provided by
law, in relation to the distribution of personal estates left by persons dying intestate.” 1871 Wyo.
Sess. Laws 89.
20

21
See 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws 149 (modifying the distribution of proceeds from a wrongful
death action judgment and adding a section protecting such proceeds from the decedent’s creditors);
1947 Wyo. Sess. Laws 156–57 (rewording the provision for how damages should be determined and
distributed); 1939 Wyo. Sess. Laws 166–67 (adding to the provision concerning the distribution
and award of damages); 1909 Wyo. Sess. Laws 5 (rewording the provision relating to damages).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(c) (“Every person for whose benefit such action is brought
may prove his respective damages, and the court or jury may award such person that amount of
damages to which it considers such person entitled.”).
22

Id. § 1-38-102(b) (“If the deceased left a husband, wife, child, father or mother, no debt of
the deceased may be satisfied out of the proceeds of any judgment obtained in any action brought
under the provisions of this section.”).
23

24
See Lawson, supra note 2, at 415 (“Not only does the Wrongful Death Act fail to provide
a definition of ‘personal representative,’ it does not point to another location where one can be
found.”); supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text.
25

See infra notes 27–35 and accompanying text.
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Code.26 As part of a larger effort in 1977 to update the entire Wyoming Code,
the legislature renumbered the wrongful death statutes.27 In 1979, the legislature
passed another housekeeping act renumbering the wrongful death statutes and
moving them from the Civil Code to the Probate Code.28 The following year,
the legislature once again renumbered the wrongful death statutes but kept them
within the Probate Code.29
In 1981, the legislature mistakenly repealed the Wrongful Death Act from
the Probate Code, believing it was duplicated in the Civil Code.30 But the statutes
were not duplicative, since earlier legislation had completely moved the Act to
the Probate Code.31 The legislature soon realized it had repealed all instances of
wrongful death and subsequently passed a corrective act in 1982 that attempted
to void its 1981 repeal of the wrongful death statutes in the Probate Code.32 Since
the 1981 repeal was legally effective and therefore not voidable, the legislature
recreated the Wrongful Death Act outside the Probate Code, in the Civil Code.33
However, the Wyoming legislature clearly stated it solely intended to correct the
inadvertent repeal of the Act in the Probate Code and did not intend to change
existing wrongful death case law or interpretation of the Act.34 Absent the mistaken
repeal in 1981, the Act would currently exist in the Probate Code, as originally
intended by the 1979 legislation.35 Since the legislature clearly intended wrongful

26
See In re Estate of Johnson, 231 P.3d 873, 878 (Wyo. 2010) (“Of primary significance is
that the separate purposes of the [probate and wrongful death] statutes are entirely distinct.”); infra
notes 27–35 and accompanying text.
27
1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 771, 916–17 (passing the act solely “to eliminate obsolete or fully
executed statutes, to conform conflicting statutes, to eliminate duplicitous or archaic language;
conforming the numbering of sections and subsections to a uniform numbering system”).

1979 Wyo. Sess. Laws 257, 311 (passing the act for the purpose of “ordering the powers
and procedures of the court concerned with the affairs of decedents and certain others”).
28

29

1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws 267–69, 370–71.

1981 Wyo. Sess. Laws 237, 242 (passing the act for the purpose of “repealing wrongful
death statutes which duplicate [Civil Code statutes]”).
30

31

See 1979 Wyo. Sess. Laws 311; supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.

1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws 93. Only if the legislature could not void the 1981 repeal of the
statutes in the probate code would the act create wrongful death statutes in the Civil Code. Id. at 94.
32

33
Id. at 92–94. This legislation created the wrongful death statutes currently in effect within
the Civil Code. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-38-101 to -102 (2010).
34
1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws 93–94 (stating the 1981 repeal of the wrongful death statutes in
the Probate Code was “inadvertent and unintentional” and its purpose in that repeal “was not to
eliminate or affect in any way causes of action for wrongful death”).
35

See id. at 93.
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death case law to remain unaffected, decisions before and after this period are
more relevant in addressing interpretation than inferring a statute’s purpose by its
section number.36

“Personal Representative” in the Wyoming Code
Wyoming’s Probate Code defines a decedent’s personal representative as the
estate’s executor or administrator.37 It also provides the procedure for appointing
a personal representative to represent a person who dies intestate.38 The Code
prioritizes certain relationships, granting the surviving spouse highest consideration,
then children, followed by the decedent’s parents.39 Upon appointment, the
personal representative must publish notice in order to provide interested parties
the opportunity to contest the appointment.40 Specifically, the representative
must send a copy of this notice to the surviving spouse and children.41 Other
references to a decedent’s “personal representative” in the Wyoming Code do not
specify criteria or authority for appointment but incorporate the Probate Code by
associating the term with estate fiduciaries, such as an administrator or executor.42

36
See Heidi L. Neuendorf, Note, The Judicial Impediment on Legislative Lawmaking in
Stratmeyer v. Stratmeyer, 44 S.D. L. Rev. 115, 139 (1999) (stating if the legislature disagreed with
the court’s interpretation of a statute, it would pass a correcting amendment); supra notes 27–35 and
accompanying text.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-301 (“‘Personal representative’ includes executor and
administrator.”); id. § 2-3-802 (“‘Fiduciary’ means a personal representative or a trustee. The term
includes an executor, administrator, successor personal representative, special administrator and a
person performing substantially the same function.”).
37

38
Id. §§ 2-4-201 (specifying a priority list of relatives of the deceased entitled to administer),
-203 (defining exceptions to those entitled to administer by reason of incompetence), -205 (describing
how to petition the court for appointment as administrator), -206 (allowing interested parties to
contest and oppose a petition for appointment), 2-7-205 (requiring notice of administration of
estates to the surviving spouse and all heirs at law of the decedent).
39

Id. § 2-4-201.

Id. § 2-7-201 (“[P]ersonal representative shall cause to be published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a daily or weekly newspaper of general circulation in the county in which
the probate is pending, a notice of . . . the appointment of the personal representative.”).
40

41

Id. § 2-7-205.

See id. §§ 1-1-109 (“‘Claimant’ means a natural person, including the personal
representative of a deceased person.”), 1-43-103 (“The privilege under this section may be claimed
by a representative of the party or by a party, his guardian or conservator, the personal representative
of a deceased party, or the successor.”), 4-10-103 (“‘Fiduciary’ means a trustee under a testamentary
or other trust, an executor, administrator, or personal representative of a decedent’s estate, or any
other party including a trust advisor or a trust protector, who is acting in a fiduciary capacity for
any person, trust or estate.”), 12-9-102 (“‘Designated member’ . . . also includes the appointed and
qualified personal representative and the testamentary trustee of a deceased individual owning an
ownership interest in a distributor’s business.”), 15-1-101 (“‘Person’ means any individual, firm,
partnership, corporation or other business entity, or the executor, administrator, trustee, receiver,
assignee or personal representative thereof.”), 17-16-850 (“‘Director’ or ‘officer’ includes, unless
42
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Prior Case Law
Generally, states grant jurisdiction to a special court to handle a decedent’s
affairs.43 Accordingly, Wyoming established a “probate court,” a district court
sitting in probate that oversees matters relating to a deceased person.44 The statute
also grants a probate court jurisdiction over other civil actions that a district
court would typically hear.45 Since the Wrongful Death Act requires a personal
representative without providing a definition or appointment process, attorneys
and courts in Wyoming have consistently relied on the Probate Code’s provisions
and consequently petitioned probate courts for the appointment.46 As early as

the context requires otherwise, the estate or personal representative of a director or officer.”), -860
(“‘Related person’ means . . . [a] domestic or foreign . . . [i]ndividual, trust or estate for whom or
of which the director is a trustee, guardian, personal representative or like fiduciary.”), 33-30-202
(“‘Person’ means any individual . . . whether or not acting as a principal, trustee, fiduciary, receiver,
or as any other kind of legal or personal representative.”), 34-13-114 (“‘Personal representative’
means an executor, administrator, successor personal representative or special administrator of
a decedent’s estate or a person legally authorized to perform substantially the same function.”),
34.1-5-102 (“‘Successor of a beneficiary’ means a person who succeeds to substantially all of the
rights of a beneficiary by operation of law, including . . . an administrator, executor, [and] personal
representative.”), 39-19-101 (“‘Personal representative’ means the executor, administrator or trustee
of the estate of the decedent, or, if there is no executor appointed, qualified and acting within
Wyoming, then any person in actual or constructive possession of any property of the decedent.”).
43
31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors and Administrators § 90 (2010) (“In many states, jurisdiction
of the administration of estates is given to special courts, designated by such names as
probate . . . courts.”).
44
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-101 (“[D]istrict courts of the state have exclusive original
jurisdiction of all matters relating to the . . . granting of letters testamentary and of administration
. . . . The court granting the letters has exclusive jurisdiction of all matters touching the settlement
and distribution of the estates for which letters have been granted.”).

Id. (“[J]urisdiction over subject matter of the district court sitting in probate, sometimes
referred to . . . as the ‘probate court,’ is coextensive with the jurisdiction over subject matter of the
district court in any civil action.”).
45

46
See Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 443 (Wyo. 1998) (“The statute requires every
wrongful death action to be brought by and in the name of the decedent’s personal representative,
i.e., the executor or administrator of the decedent’s estate.”); Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055,
1062 (Wyo. 1984) (“We further hold that the wrongful death action now is brought by the personal
representative in his capacity as administrator of the decedent’s estate.”); Jordan v. Delta Drilling
Co., 541 P.2d 39, 42 (Wyo. 1975) (“[T]he administrator or executor [of the estate as appointed
under the probate code] must bring the action.”), overruled by Wetering, 682 P.2d 1055, as recognized
in In re Estate of Johnson, 231 P.3d 873, 879 (Wyo. 2010); Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901,
902–03 (Wyo. 1963) (“[T]here is no authority in this State either by statute or decision whereby
a district court, unless sitting in probate, would be authorized to appoint a father as the personal
representative of a deceased son for the purposes of a death action.”), overruled by Johnson, 231 P.3d
at 879; Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 3 P.2d 105, 105 (Wyo. 1931) (“This [wrongful death] action
was brought by [the] administratrix of the estate.”); Lawson, supra note 2, at 415 (“Without a clear
definition of ‘personal representative’ located in the Wrongful Death Act or elsewhere in the Civil
Code, it appears that presently the only option is to refer to the Probate Code.”).
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1931, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated in Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester that a
personal representative for a wrongful death action is the same as the administrator
of the estate but acts as a trustee for the beneficiaries in bringing the civil action.47
In that case, the court emphasized that while the wrongful death action is not
brought to benefit the decedent’s estate, the estate’s administrator is the party
required to bring the action.48
The Honorable V.J. Tidball authored a 1947 article explaining that while
the wrongful death statutes lie outside the Probate Code, the probate court
appoints the representative to pursue that civil action.49 The representative then
pursues the wrongful death action in the district court, outside of probate.50 Upon
completing the action, the representative reports back to the probate court, which
then discharges him of his duties.51 Whether the decedent names an administrator
prior to death or dies intestate, the probate court appoints the representative who
performs two roles—one as the representative of the estate and another as a trustee
for the beneficiaries in a wrongful death action.52 While Judge Tidball focuses on
how the representative distributes a wrongful death action’s proceeds, he reiterates
the widely held belief by practitioners at the time that the Probate Code controls
the appointment of the personal representative.53
Sixteen years later in 1963, the Wyoming Supreme Court reinforced its
position in Bircher v. Foster, which the Johnson majority overruled in 2010.54 In
Bircher, the court held the executor or administrator of a decedent’s estate was the
only person who may bring a wrongful death action.55 The decision specifically

47

See 3 P.2d at 108 (“The administrator acts but in the capacity of a trustee.”).

48

Id.

V.J. Tidball, Probate Jurisdiction in Wrongful Death Actions, 2 Wyo. L.J. 109, 109 (1947)
(“[T]he only jurisdiction the District Court, sitting as a Probate Court, has in such actions is to
appoint an administrator or executor, fix his bond and discharge him when he reports to the Probate
Court that he has performed his duties regarding such action.”).
49

50

Id.

51

Id.

Id. (“The personal representative appointed by the Probate Court acts in a dual capacity.
He acts as executor or administrator of the estate under the jurisdiction of the Probate Court
and he acts as a trustee in the wrongful death action . . . entirely outside the jurisdiction of the
Probate Court.”).
52

53

See id. at 109–10.

See Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901, 902 (Wyo. 1963), overruled by In Re Estate of Johnson,
231 P.3d 873, 879 (Wyo. 2010).
54

55
Bircher, 378 P.2d at 902 (“[T]his court in the past has been consistent in holding that
the only person who could bring an action for wrongful death was the personal representative of
the deceased, the executor or administrator of decedent’s estate. We see no reason why these views
should now be altered.”).
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affirmed the probate court’s exclusive authority to appoint a decedent’s personal
representative.56
In 1975, the court, in Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., allowed the acting
administrator of the estate to bring a wrongful death action while acknowledging
the Wrongful Death Act’s placement outside the Probate Code.57 Despite the
Act’s placement in the Civil Code, the court reasoned it must appoint someone
as the personal representative of the decedent and the Probate Code provides the
appropriate process to do so.58 Two years later and just as the legislature began
renumbering statutes, the court again, in DeHerrera v. Herrera, reinforced the
Act’s reliance on the Probate Code.59 In that case, the court held that while the Act
is in the Civil Code, the Probate Code controls the appointment of the wrongful
death action’s personal representative.60
In 1984, following the period of statutory revisions discussed earlier, the
Wyoming Supreme Court stated, in Wetering v. Eisele, the administrator of the
decedent’s estate appropriately brought the wrongful death action.61 In 1998
the court again, in Corkill v. Knowles, expressly incorporated the Probate Code
by equating the wrongful death action’s personal representative to the executor
or administrator of the decedent’s estate.62 The court noted the Probate Code
contained significant definitions, which provide that a personal representative
includes an administrator of the estate of an intestate decedent.63 The following
year the Wyoming Supreme Court went even further and held, in Butler v. Halstead,
Wyoming’s Probate Code identifies the wrongful death action’s beneficiaries.64 As

56
See id. at 903 (stating a district court not sitting in probate lacks the authority to appoint a
personal representative for the purpose of bringing a wrongful death action).

541 P.2d 39, 41 (Wyo. 1975) (“The plaintiff-appellant was appointed, qualified and is the
acting administratrix of the estate.”), overruled by Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984), as
recognized in Johnson, 231 P.3d at 879.
57

58
Jordan, 541 P.2d at 42 (“[D]esignation of an administrator is no more than a statutory
device to provide a party for a civil action to collect damages and pay them over to the persons
entitled.”); see, e.g., Note, Minor’s Rights in a Wrongful Death Suit, 10 Gonz. L. Rev. 226, 228
(1974) (addressing the conceptually confusing role of the personal representative in wrongful death
actions because she acts both as a trustee for the beneficiaries of the action and as a fiduciary for
the estate).
59

DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 482 (Wyo. 1977).

60

Id.

682 P.2d at 1062 (“[T]he wrongful death action now is brought by the personal
representative in his capacity as administrator of the decedent’s estate.”); see supra notes 25–36 and
accompanying text (discussing the statutory revisions).
61

62

955 P.2d 438, 443 (Wyo. 1998).

Id. at 443 n.4 (“The pertinent definitions, found in Wyoming’s Probate Code, provide that
a personal representative includes an executor and administrator.”).
63

See 770 P.2d 698, 700 (Wyo. 1989) (“[T]he persons for whose benefit a wrongful death
action is brought are all of those persons identified in § 2-4-201 [of the Probate Code].”).
64
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in earlier decisions, the Butler court restricted the Probate Code from applying to
the proceeds from a wrongful death action, as the Wrongful Death Act contains
provisions for distributing awarded damages.65 This long history of wrongful
death cases in Wyoming demonstrates a consistent practice of incorporating the
Probate Code’s definitions and provisions to wrongful death actions, particularly
when appointing the personal representative.66

Other States’ Wrongful Death Acts
Many United States jurisdictions enacted wrongful death statutes around
the same time as Wyoming and based commonly on Lord Campbell’s Act.67
Accordingly, other states’ interpretations and case law are instructive when
discussing a term’s plain meaning and a legislature’s intent in creating the statute.68
The majority of state wrongful death statutes use terms referencing the decedent’s
estate such as administrator, executor, or personal representative.69 Particularly,
the District of Columbia and West Virginia’s wrongful death statutes mirror
Wyoming’s language specifying a wrongful death action “shall be brought by and
in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person.”70 Eighteen
states also require the decedent’s personal representative to bring wrongful death
actions and in some instances alternatively allow a surviving spouse to directly bring
the action.71 Eight states are even more specific and expressly reference probate
codes or incorporate references to the decedent’s estate in their wrongful death
statutes.72 In the absence of a specific statutory link to the probate code, courts

65
Id. (stating the wrongful death action’s award damages are controlled by the Wrongful
Death Act, not by the Probate Code).
66

See supra notes 46–65 and accompanying text.

See Speiser et al., supra note 16, § 1:9 (discussing the history of American wrongful death
statutes); supra notes 18–35 and accompanying text (explaining the development of Wyoming’s
wrongful death statutes).
67

See generally Speiser et al., supra note 16, at app. A (providing a complete, detailed listing
of state wrongful death statutes).
68

See Speiser et al., supra note 16, § 11:28 (“In roughly half of the states the wrongful death
act provides: ‘Every such action shall be brought by and in name of the personal representative.’”).
Additionally, the federal death statutes designate the personal representative “as the party plaintiff ”
and general maritime law grants the personal representative standing to sue for “the nonstatutory
remedy for wrongful death.” Id. § 11:29.
69

70
D.C. Code § 16-2702 (2010); accord W. Va. Code Ann. § 55-7-6 (2010) (using the
phrase “such personal representative”).
71
See Speiser et al., supra note 16, at app. A (detailing wrongful death statutes for Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington).
72
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-612 (2010) (“‘[P]ersonal representative’ includes
any person to whom letters testamentary or of administration are granted.”); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.2922 (2010) (“Every [wrongful death] action . . . shall be brought by, and in the name of,
the personal representative of the estate of the deceased.”); Speiser et al., supra note 16, at app. A
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in these jurisdictions consistently interpret the term “personal representative” to
refer to the executor or administrator of the estate.73 For example, in a federal West
Virginia case decided in 2007, the district court stated a wrongful death action’s
“personal representative must generally be the administrator of the estate.”74
Similarly, in a 2010 decision from the District of Columbia, the court concluded
that in the context of a wrongful death action, the term “personal representative
is strictly construed . . . to mean only the decedent’s executor or administrator.”75
The remaining twenty-two states’ wrongful death statutes are less similar
to Wyoming’s Wrongful Death Act and are generally less restrictive than the
majority of jurisdictions, allowing alternative plaintiffs or providing detailed
definitions of terms.76 However, as in the majority of states, references to the
executor, administrator, and representative in the context of wrongful death
actions consistently refer to the decedent’s estate.77 For example, Georgia and
Rhode Island explicitly allow a surviving spouse, child, or parent to bring an
action for wrongful death but otherwise require the administrator or executor

(listing complete wrongful death statutes for Arizona, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, New Jersey, and South Carolina). Maine’s wrongful death statute exists in the state’s
probate code. Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 18, § 2-804 (2010).
73
See, e.g., Hatas v. Partin, 175 So. 2d 759, 761 (Ala. 1965) (“The words ‘personal representative’
. . . can only mean the executor or administrator of the injured testator or intestate.”); Gresham
v. Strickland, 784 So. 2d 578, 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he right to bring a punitive
damages claim for wrongful death belongs exclusively to the personal representative of the estate.”);
In re Estate of Hutman, 705 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]he determination of
who becomes a special administrator does not rest solely upon who wins the proverbial race to
the courthouse. Rather, the person chosen must also be qualified under the [Probate Code].”);
Bennett v. Nicholas, 250 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (“[A] wrongful-death action can
only be brought by the estate’s lawful representative, either the executor or administrator.”); Henkel
v. Hood, 156 P.2d 790, 794 (N.M. 1945) (Bickley, J., concurring specially) (“When the Legislature
employed the phrase ‘personal representative’ they meant executor or administrator of the estate of
the deceased.”); Ramsey v. Neiman, 634 N.E.2d 211, 214 (Ohio 1994) (“[Wrongful death actions]
must be brought in the name of a person appointed by a court to be the administrator, executor, or
personal representative of the decedent’s estate.”); Speiser et al., supra note 16, § 11:30 (“It is also a
principle that a personal representative must have been validly and legally appointed to administer
the decedent’s estate . . . in order to bring a wrongful death action.”).
74

Thomas v. Brooks Run Mining Co., 504 F. Supp. 2d 121, 127 (S.D. W. Va. 2007).

75

Estate of Manook v. Research Triangle Inst. Int’l, 693 F. Supp. 2d 4, 17 (D.C. 2010).

See Speiser et al., supra note 16, at app. A (detailing wrongful death statutes for California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin); infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
76

77
See, e.g., Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 557 A.2d 116, 117 (Conn. 1989) (“[A wrongful
death action] may be maintained only by an executor or administrator of an estate.”); Young v.
Marshburn, 180 S.E.2d 43, 44 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971) (“[Only] the executor, administrator, or
collector of an estate can maintain an action for wrongful death.”); Speiser et al., supra note 16,
§ 11:30 (“It is also a principle that a personal representative must have been validly and legally
appointed to administer the decedent’s estate . . . in order to bring a wrongful death action.”).
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of the estate to bring the action.78 Twelve states have more liberally constructed
statutes, allowing a range of interested parties or beneficiaries to bring a wrongful
death action.79 Delaware’s statute, in particular, does not identify who may bring
a wrongful death action but was interpreted in 1985 to allow the decedent’s
personal representative or named beneficiaries as plaintiffs.80 New Hampshire is
unique because it also allows any interested party to initiate an action but requires
that an appointed administrator pursue the action.81 Lastly, four states have the
most complete and detailed wrongful death statutes—providing priority lists,
criteria for appointment, and giving first priority to the surviving spouse and
children over the surviving parents, similar to Wyoming’s Probate Code.82
As this survey demonstrates, in states with wrongful death statutes using
the term “personal representative,” courts consistently relate the term to the
administrator or executor of the decedent’s estate, therefore incorporating the

Ga. Code Ann. § 51-4-5 (2010) (“When there is no [surviving spouse, children, or
parents] entitled to bring an action for the wrongful death of a decedent . . . the administrator or
executor of the decedent may bring an action for . . . the next of kin.”); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 10-7-1.2,
-2 (2010) (specifying a wrongful death action must be brought by the executor or administrator of
the deceased, but allowing parents to bring actions for a child’s wrongful death).
78

See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315.2 (2010) (listing who may bring an action and giving
the surviving spouse and children highest priority); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.080 (2010) (“[Wrongful
death actions may be brought by] the spouse or children or the surviving lineal descendants of any
deceased children, natural or adopted, legitimate or illegitimate, or by the father or mother of the
deceased.”); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-106 (West 2010) (“[The decedent’s] heirs, or his personal
representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may maintain [a wrongful death] action.”); Wis. Stat.
§ 895.04 (2010) (“An action for wrongful death may be brought by the personal representative of
the deceased person or by the person to whom the amount recovered belongs.”); Hanson v. Valdivia,
187 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Wis. 1971) (“When there is a surviving spouse the action must be brought
by or on behalf of that spouse.”); Speiser et al., supra note 16, at app. A (providing wrongful death
statutes for Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin).
79

80
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3724 (2010); Johnson v. Physicians Anesthesia Servs., P.A.,
621 F. Supp. 908, 916 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he Court finds that actions under the new wrongful death
act can be brought either by the personal representative ‘for the benefit of ’ the wife, husband,
parents, and child of a deceased person or by the named beneficiaries themselves.”).

See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 556:19 (2010) (“Any person interested in the estate of a person
deceased may begin an action as administrator . . . if the administrator then or afterward appointed
shall . . . prosecute it as plaintiff.”); see also Tanner v. King, 157 A.2d 643, 644 (N.H. 1960)
(“[T]he Legislature in the interest of expediency wanted to allow any interested person to initiate
such an action provided it be prosecuted thereafter by an administrator.”).
81

See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60 (West 2010) (“A [wrongful death action] may be
asserted by . . . the decedent’s personal representative [or the] decedent’s surviving spouse, domestic
partner, children, [or] the persons . . . who would be entitled to the property of the decedent by
intestate succession.”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-201 (2010) (allowing a wrongful death action to
be brought by the deceased’s surviving spouse, heir or heirs, designated beneficiary, or parents if the
deceased is an unmarried minor, in that order); Speiser et al., supra note 16, at app. A (detailing
wrongful death statutes for California, Colorado, North Dakota, and Tennessee).
82
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probate code.83 State legislatures intending to grant the right to bring a wrongful
death action to individuals other than an administrator or executor, consciously
either omitted the term “personal representative” or, more importantly, specifically
identified alternative plaintiffs.84 Accordingly, the Wyoming legislature’s choice to
designate the personal representative as the sole party to bring a wrongful death
action is significant, and the court should construe the designation as a conscious
and deliberate use of the term.85

Principal Case
Larry Johnson died intestate in March 2008.86 In September 2008, his father
petitioned the probate court for appointment as his son’s personal representative
in order to file a wrongful death claim.87 The probate court approved the petition
and appointed him the personal representative without providing notice to Larry
Johnson’s surviving wife and two children.88 In October 2008, the wife petitioned
the court, requesting the court revoke the father’s appointment and appoint her as
the personal representative instead.89 Her petition cited the priority list contained
in the Probate Code, which gives her preference.90 The district court denied her
petition and upheld the father’s appointment as the personal representative.91
The wife appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court, contending the trial
court, sitting in probate, abused its discretion by ignoring the Probate Code.92 She
argued the trial court’s disregard of the Probate Code’s provisions leaves a judge
See Speiser et al., supra note 16, § 11:28 (“Under such a provision, the action must be
brought and maintained by the personal representative of the person for whose death the damages
are sought.”); supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
83

See Speiser et al., supra note 16, § 11:28 (“On the other hand, a personal representative is
not entitled to bring a death action where the right of action is granted to designated persons other
than the decedent’s personal representative.”); supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
84

See Morris v. CMS Oil & Gas Co., 227 P.3d 325, 333 (Wyo. 2010) (stating the lack of
additional words clarifying a term in a statute is an intentional act by the legislature and does not
provide a reason to add additional meaning); Keats v. State, 64 P.3d 104, 113 (Wyo. 2003) (“We
are not . . . free to ignore any word that the legislature has chosen to place in a statute, and every
word is presumed to have a meaning.”); supra notes 18–35 and accompanying text (explaining the
development and legislative history of Wyoming’s Wrongful Death Act).
85

86

In re Estate of Johnson, 231 P.3d 873, 876 (Wyo. 2010).

87

Id.

Brief of Appellant at 5, Johnson, 231 P.3d 873 (No. S-09-0040), 2009 WL 1701477
[hereinafter Appellant’s Brief ].
88

89

Id.

Id.; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-201 (2010) (“The relatives of the deceased . . . are entitled to
administer in the following order: (i) The surviving husband or wife, or some competent person
whom he or she may request to have appointed; (ii) The children; (iii) The father or mother.”).
90

91

Johnson, 231 P.3d at 876.

Appellant’s Brief, supra note 88, at 8 (arguing the court disregarded established Wyoming
law and relevant statutes which give the wife priority).
92
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free to appoint any individual as the personal representative—regardless of his or
her interest in the case—ultimately resulting in petitioners racing to the court for
appointment.93 In reply, the father contested the wife’s standing to challenge his
appointment and bring the appeal.94 Additionally, he argued the Probate Code
does not govern decisions in appointing a personal representative for the purposes
of bringing a wrongful death claim, because the Wrongful Death Act fails to
define personal representative or to refer to the Probate Code.95 He contended
since the personal representative acts as a fiduciary for all those who can bring a
claim in the wrongful death action, it does not matter who is appointed.96

Majority Opinion
In writing for the majority, Chief Justice Voigt, joined by Justices Kite and
Burke, first addressed the issue of the wife’s standing to challenge the appointment.97
Both the majority and dissent agreed Larry Johnson’s wife had standing due to
her substantial interest in the outcome of a wrongful death action brought in
his name.98 As a potential personal representative, claimant, and mother of two
other possible claimants, her personal stake in the action sufficiently warranted
her challenge.99 The court also noted the decedent’s spouse is given the highest
priority as administrator under the Probate Code.100 Having determined the wife
had standing to appeal the decision, the court focused the bulk of its discussion
on addressing whether the Probate Code governs the appointment of a personal
representative for the purposes of bringing a wrongful death action, and if it does
not, what should.101
In addressing this issue, the majority began by listing the statutes at issue
in the appeal, specifically pointing out that the Wrongful Death Act exists
outside and separate from the Probate Code.102 Noting its “brevity,” the court
addressed the Act’s susceptibility to inconsistent judicial interpretation as well
as the legislative confusion in the early 1980s concerning its place and purpose
in the Wyoming code.103 The court ultimately concluded that the probate court

93

Id. at 17.

94

Appellee’s Brief at 6, Johnson, 231 P.3d 873 (No. S-09-0040), 2009 WL 1872373.

95

Id. at 8.

96

Id. at 13–15.

97

Johnson, 231 P.3d at 875–77, 882.

98

Id. at 876.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

See id. at 875–76.

102

Id. at 876–78.

103

Id. at 878.
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should not have accepted any petition for appointment as personal representative
to bring a wrongful death action and that such was the province of the district
court, not sitting in probate.104 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated the
appointment of a personal representative for the purpose of bringing a wrongful
death action is distinctly separate from the Probate Code and, though the father
had the right and ability to act as the personal representative, a probate action
should not determine such an appointment.105
Since the court determined the appointment of a personal representative to
pursue a wrongful death action is a decision that should be made independent
of the Probate Code, the court suggested criteria and guidelines for courts to
follow.106 Oddly, directly after proclaiming the Probate Code as not controlling,
the court suggested using the Probate Code’s priority list, particularly when a party
contests the appointment.107 The court stated this list reflects legislative policy
in prioritizing significant relationships and is useful in considering a personal
representative’s suitability.108 The court suggested the district court should also
consider the petitioner’s financial and physical ability, geographic location,
intentions, stake in the outcome, and family dynamics.109 Acknowledging the
lack of guidance contained in the Wrongful Death Act, the court warned against
appointing a personal representative on solely a first-come, first-served basis
and suggested notice, or the lack thereof, to other potential personal representa
tives provides an additional consideration in determining who the court will
ultimately appoint.110

Dissent
Justice Hill dissented, joined by Justice Golden.111 He contended the
legislature always intended the Probate Code to control the personal representative
appointment in a wrongful death action.112 He utilized legislative history in
arguing the majority’s reasoning disregarded the clear intent of the Wrongful
Death Act and left the appointment of the personal representative in a wrongful

104

Id. at 880.

105

Id.

106

Id. at 880–81.

107

Id. at 881.

108

Id.

109

Id.

Id. (“The only test of who is appointed as personal representative, despite the lack of
guidance within the wrongful death act, cannot simply be who first gets to the courthouse. There is
some hint in the record that just such a race occurred in this case.”).
110

111

Id. at 882 (Hill, J., dissenting).

112

Id. at 882.
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death action up to the broad and general discretion of the district court.113 This
essentially removed the reasonable and widely-accepted priority list and notice
requirements specified in the Probate Code.114 He stated no reason supports the
proposition the father should have priority over the wife in a wrongful death
claim.115 Further, he acknowledged the wife clearly holds “statutory entitlement”
and no extenuating circumstances exist that would otherwise disqualify her
appointment.116 Justice Hill concluded by stating the probate court should control
a personal representative’s appointment.117 Furthermore, instead of remanding
the case to the lower court and ordering the dismissal of the entire probate action,
the Wyoming Supreme Court should have ordered the court to appoint the wife
as the personal representative in the wrongful death action.118

Analysis
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson overruled wellestablished Wyoming case law, leaving practitioners guessing as to how Wyoming
courts will appoint personal representatives in future wrongful death actions.119
The court recognized that appointment cannot rest solely on who petitions the
courthouse first and suggested the lower court, on remand, should consider the
Probate Code’s provisions.120 However, by divorcing the Probate Code from the
appointment process it traditionally controlled, the Wyoming Supreme Court
opened up the term “personal representative” to expansive interpretation, thereby
allowing appointments to stand based solely on a court’s broad discretion.121
This case note argues the obvious meaning of “personal representative”
refers to the representative of a decedent’s estate and Wyoming’s Probate Code
provides the most complete and definite structure among the state’s statutes for
interpreting the term.122 Historically, the legislature and the Wyoming Supreme
Court supported the relationship between the statutes by specifically limiting
113
Id. at 882–83 (discussing the legislative histories of the wrongful death and probate
statutes, out of which the legislature appears to have unintentionally created the debate addressed in
this case).
114

Id.

115

Id. at 883.

116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Id.

See id. at 882–83 (stating the majority opinion removes the priority generally given to a
spouse which does nothing but “perpetuate irrational ‘complexities’ and . . . create new ‘ambiguities’
where none exist”).
119

120

Id. at 881 (majority opinion).

See infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text (discussing the history of Wyoming case law
and the Wrongful Death Act in relation to the Probate Code).
121

122

See infra notes 127–39 and accompanying text.
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particular Probate Code provisions from applying to wrongful death actions.123
Wyoming case law also demonstrates courts and practitioners have long agreed
the probate court controls appointment.124 This case note argues the Johnson
court—in divorcing the Probate Code from the wrongful death statute’s personal
representative requirement—resurrected legal issues the Probate Code and case
law had previously put to rest.125 Lastly, a comparison of the Johnson court’s
decision to other states’ wrongful death statutes and decisions demonstrates the
anomaly created in Wyoming law by opening the appointment of the decedent’s
personal representative to a court’s broad discretion.126

Plain Meaning
When interpreting the legislature’s intent behind the Act, the court incorrectly
emphasized the separate purposes served by the Civil and Probate Codes.127
Instead, Wyoming’s well-established rules of statutory interpretation grant the
plain and ordinary meaning of words the greatest deference when attempting to
follow legislative intent concerning a term or phrase in a statute.128 The plain and
ordinary meaning of the term “personal representative” refers to the executor,
administrator, or other court-appointed individual representing the decedent’s
estate.129 Considering other sections of the Wyoming code, in which the personal
123

See infra notes 140–47 and accompanying text.

124

See infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 158–64 and accompanying text. See generally Jordan Wilder Connors,
Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108
Colum. L. Rev. 681, 688 (2008) (“[S]tare decisis . . . reduces the amount of research and analysis
required in cases analogous to cases the Court has ruled on before.”).
125

126

See infra notes 165–71 and accompanying text.

Compare In re Estate of Johnson, 231 P.3d 873, 878 (Wyo. 2010) (“Of primary significance
is that the separate purposes of the two statutes are entirely distinct.”), with Halliburton Energy
Servs., Inc. v. Gunter, 167 P.3d 645, 649 n.3 (Wyo. 2007) (“[We realize] there is a difference
between probate estates and wrongful death estates, and that the statutes governing the latter are in
the Civil Code rather than the probate code, but we believe the probate code statute is instructive
in determining the intent of the Civil Code statute.”).
127

128
See Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. State ex rel. Wyo. Att’y Gen., 221 P.3d 306, 312
(Wyo. 2009) (“[The court’s] paramount consideration is the legislature’s intent as reflected in the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.”); RME Petrol. Co. v. Wyo. Dep’t
of Revenue, 150 P.3d 673, 683 (Wyo. 2007) (stating if reasonable persons agree on the meaning
with consistency and predictability, it is considered clear and unambiguous and the plain language
meaning holds); Debora A. Person, Legislative Histories and the Practice of Statutory Interpretation in
Wyoming, 10 Wyo. L. Rev. 559, 566 (2010) (explaining how numerous Wyoming Supreme Court
decisions show the court should apply the plain and ordinary meaning of a term).

See Willis v. Pan Am. Ref. Corp., 26 F. Supp. 990, 993 (D. Md. 1939) (citing Briggs v.
Walker, 171 U.S. 466 (1898) (“In giving the right of action to the personal representative without
further description [in the Federal Employers’ Liability Act], Congress evidently intended to confer
the right upon the lawfully and properly appointed executor or administrator of the decedent.”));
Unif. Probate Code § 1-201 (amended 2008) (“‘Personal representative’ includes executor,
administrator, successor personal representative, special administrator, and persons who perform
129
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representative refers to the administrator, executor, or other estate representative,
the legislature was mindful of this plain meaning.130 The concise statutory
language used here and, more importantly, the lack of subsequent changes despite
numerous opportunities demonstrate the legislature understood and accepted the
plain meaning of the term as referring to the Probate Code.131
The legislature’s careful use of the definite article “the” in the Act further
supports the interpretation that the personal representative refers to a pre-existing
representative of the decedent.132 At the time the Wyoming legislature created
the Act, the complaint typically had to show the plaintiff was the appointed
representative of the estate.133 However, the Johnson majority considered opening
a probate court action in the absence of an estate “absurd,” even though other
courts and legal writers easily accept such a situation and recognize the Act’s
language requires the representative’s appointment before filing a wrongful
death action.134 The legislature could have easily changed the language to use an
substantially the same function under the law governing their status.”); 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors and
Administrators § 7 (2010) (“The commonly accepted definition of ‘personal representative’ includes
an executor or administrator, and the Uniform Probate Code uses this term almost exclusively,
instead of ‘executor’ and ‘administrator.’” (footnote omitted)); Black’s Law Dictionary 1416–17
(9th ed. 2009) (“[A personal representative is a] person who manages the legal affairs of another
because of incapacity or death, such as the executor of an estate.”); Tiffany, supra note 16, at 237
(“Where the statute requires the action to be brought in the name of the personal representative, the
complaint must allege the appointment of the plaintiff as executor or administrator.”).
130
See Pagel v. Franscell, 57 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Wyo. Cmty. Coll.
Comm’n v. Casper Cmty. Coll. Dist., 31 P.3d 1242, 1249 (Wyo. 2001)); Person, supra note 128,
at 567 (“Statutes are construed as a whole with the ordinary and obvious meaning applied to the
words as they are arranged in paragraphs, sentences, clauses, and phrases.”); supra notes 37–42 and
accompanying text (citing other Wyoming statutes that use the term “personal representative”).
131
See supra notes 13–36 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of wrongful death
in Wyoming).
132
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102 (2010); Melissa C. King, Are Kerps Alive in Essence? The
Viability of Executive Incentive Bonus Plans After 11 U.S.C. § 503(C)(1), 82 St. John’s L. Rev. 1509,
1526 (2008) (“[I]t is a rule of law well established that the definite article ‘the’ particularizes the
subject which it precedes.” (quoting Am. Bus. Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 2000))).
133
See Tiffany, supra note 16, at 237 (“[F]ailure to amend the [wrongful death] complaint
so as to show that the . . . plaintiff was administrator of the estate of the deceased was a fatal
defect.”); Person, supra note 128, at 567 (stating a court must interpret a statute’s words as they were
understood at the time the statute was created).

In re Estate of Johnson, 231 P.3d 873, 880 (Wyo. 2010); see Carrick v. Cent. Gen. Hosp.,
414 N.E.2d 632, 636 n.2 (N.Y. 1980) (“It is well established that the existence of a qualified
administrator is essential to the maintenance of the action and that the statutory right to recover
for wrongful death does not even arise until an administrator has been named through the issuance
of letters of administration.”); Murg v. Barnsdall Nursing Home, 123 P.3d 21, 25 (Okla. 2005)
(holding it appropriate to reopen a probate estate and appoint a new individual as personal
representative for the purpose of bringing a wrongful death action when the previous personal
representative for the estate refused to pursue the action); Richardson v. Kennedy, 475 S.E.2d 418,
426 (W. Va. 1996) (stating if the decedent’s estate is closed prior to bringing a wrongful death
action, the court should reopen it and appoint the petitioner as representative to pursue the action);
134
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indefinite article such as “a” personal representative or added specific appointment
criteria if it intended for the appointment of multiple representatives within the
action or separate from estate matters.135 Instead, retaining “the” in the Act limits
the meaning and interpretation of “personal representative,” preventing multiple
petitions for appointment.136

Legislative Actions
In deciding Larry Johnson’s father should not have petitioned the probate
court for appointment, the Wyoming Supreme Court gave too much consideration
to the placement of the wrongful death statutes outside the Probate Code.137 The
majority misinterpreted the statutes’ placement in the Code as legislative intent
to separate the two actions, when it resulted simply from the legislature’s desire to
clarify and update the overall Wyoming Code.138 The legislature clearly intended
to limit its involvement at that time to housekeeping matters, not “to eliminate or
affect in any way causes of action for wrongful death.”139
The Johnson majority also misinterpreted legislative changes to the wrongful
death statutory language as indications of an intent to dissociate the Probate Code
from wrongful death actions entirely.140 The court admitted that in its 1963 Bircher

Cooley, supra note 14, at 95 (“[A]n administrator may by appointed for the purpose of bringing [a
wrongful death action] though there be no estate.”); Fowler Vincent Harper, Comment, Jurisdiction
to Appoint an Administrator to Sue for Wrongful Death, 6 Ind. L.J. 506, 510 (1930) (“The [Indiana]
statute recognizes the validity of administration when there is no estate except the claim for
wrongful death.”).
135
See BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Madsen, 53 P.3d 1088, 1091 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Application of
Hotel St. George Corp., 207 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (1960)) (“In a statute, ‘a’ usually means ‘any.’”);
King, supra note 132, at 1526 (quoting Am. Bus. Ass’n, 231 F.3d at 4–5 (stating the use of ‘the’
connotes a limitation while ‘a’ or ‘an’ is more general).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102; see BP Am. Prod. Co., 53 P.3d at 1092 (citing Brooks v.
Zabka, 450 P.2d 653, 655 (Colo. 1969) (en banc)) (“[I]n construing statutes, the definite article
‘the’ is a word of limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of ‘a’ or ‘an.’”).
136

See Johnson, 231 P.3d at 880 (concluding the personal representative appointment in a
wrongful death action has “nothing to do with the appointment of an executor or administrator
under the probate code”); supra notes 13–36 and accompanying text (explaining the placement of
the Wrongful Death Act in the Wyoming Code).
137

138
Compare Johnson, 231 P.3d at 878 (“Of primary significance is that the separate purposes of
the two statutes are entirely distinct.”), with Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Wyo. 1984)
(“[W]e know that at one time these [wrongful death] provisions were included in the probate code,
and although subsequently renumbered the legislation which accomplished the renumbering did
not manifest any purpose to eliminate these provisions from the probate code.”).

1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws 93–94; see supra notes 21–36 and accompanying text (discussing the
period of legislative changes in the 1970s and 1980s).
139

See 2 Edgar B. Kinkead, The Law of Pleading 834 (1985) (“The right to sue [for wrongful
death], being purely statutory and in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed
[and] extended only to the personal representative.”).
140
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holding, the court expressly connected the Wrongful Death Act to the intestacy
statutes as “a viable construction of the statutes as they stood at that time.”141
Since Bircher, the legislature replaced the Act’s reference to the Probate Code,
which distributed the proceeds from a wrongful death action, with a provision
allowing nearly anyone the opportunity to recover damages.142 Additionally, since
1963 it enacted provisions protecting the proceeds from a wrongful death action
from creditors of the decedent’s estate.143 The Johnson court inferred from these
changes that the association to the Probate Code no longer existed and specifically
overruled Bircher.144
The Wyoming Supreme Court erroneously interpreted these modifications as
a directive from the legislature to divorce the entire Probate Code from applying
to the Wrongful Death Act.145 Instead, limiting specific Probate Code provisions
from applying to wrongful death actions illustrates the legislature recognized an
established relationship between them.146 By distinguishing the decedent’s heirs
from the wrongful death action beneficiaries and protecting the proceeds from
estate creditors, the legislature demonstrated it could have isolated the wrongful
death statutes from the Probate Code entirely, but instead it retained the language
requiring the personal representative to bring an action.147

141
Johnson, 231 P.3d at 879 (referring to the 1963 wrongful death statute that required the
award from a wrongful death action to be distributed per the Probate Code).

Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-38-102(c) (2010) (“The court . . . may award such damages . . . as
shall be deemed fair and just.”); see supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (discussing changes
made to the damages provision of Wyoming’s wrongful death statutes).
142

143
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102 (“[N]o debt of the deceased may be satisfied out of the
proceeds of any judgment obtained in any action brought under the provisions of this section.”);
1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws 149 (modifying the distribution of proceeds from a wrongful death action
judgment and adding a section protecting such proceeds from the decedent’s creditors).
144
Johnson, 231 P.3d at 879 (“[I]t is now clear that a wrongful death action is not to be
processed under the probate code.”); see 21 C.J.S. Courts § 202 (2010) (“A court should be reluctant
to overrule its interpretation of statutory language after the legislature has reenacted or amended the
statute without modifying or expressing disagreement with the construed language.”).

See Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 728–29 (D. Wyo. 1961) (exempting the
in-state requirement of the probate code from applying to wrongful death actions without limiting
other provisions); Speiser et al., supra note 16, § 11:31 (explaining the majority of states allow
personal representatives appointed outside the wrongful death action’s jurisdiction to maintain the
action, where generally a representative lacks authority outside the jurisdiction of appointment);
supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting the legislature retained the personal representative
requirement); infra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
145

146
See Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Wyo. 1984) (“When the legislature adopts a
statute it is presumed to have done so with full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference
to the subject matter of the statute.”); supra notes 127–36 and accompanying text (noting the
legislature retained the personal representative requirement while cognizant of existing case law).

See 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws 149 (deleting the language identifying specific beneficiaries
of a wrongful death action and adding a section protecting such proceeds from the decedent’s
creditors); Wetering, 682 P.2d at 1061 (concluding the legislature, in amending the Wrongful Death
147
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Wyoming Case Law
In the years between Bircher and Johnson, the Wyoming Supreme Court
decided cases the Johnson majority overlooked, and these cases reinforced the
connection of personal representative in the Wrongful Death Act to the Probate
Code.148 Because the Act as applied in Wyoming always existed outside of the
Probate Code, case law provides a more accurate source of legislative intent
than the majority’s reliance on the Act’s placement.149 Wyoming courts and
practitioners have long interpreted the term “personal representative” to mean the
administrator or executor of the decedent’s estate, and the lack of congressional
modifications following these cases demonstrates the legislature’s acquiescence to
this interpretation.150 While the Act does not reference the Probate Code and
vice versa, the Wyoming Supreme Court has traditionally applied the Probate
Code’s definitions and provisions in deciding wrongful death issues.151 Notably,
practitioners in Wyoming previously considered a probate court appointment of
the personal representative not only appropriate but required.152

Act in 1973, must have assumed the probate code’s provisions for intestate descent would apply);
supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text (outlining the legislature’s previous amendments to the
wrongful death statutes).
148
See Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 443 (Wyo. 1998); DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d
479, 482 (Wyo. 1977); Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 42 (Wyo. 1975), overruled
by Wetering, 682 P.2d 1055, as recognized in Johnson, 231 P.3d at 879; Coliseum Motor Co. v.
Hester, 3 P.2d 105, 108 (Wyo. 1931); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 202 (2010) (describing how overruling
a decision also overrules holdings based on that overruled decision); Connors, supra note 125, at
682 (“The Supreme Court considers stare decisis—the obligation to adhere to past opinions—to be
‘indispensable’ to the ‘rule of law.’”); supra notes 54–66 and accompanying text (discussing relevant
cases decided between 1963 and 2010).

See 1979 Wyo. Sess. Laws 257, 311 (moving the Wrongful Death Act to the Probate Code);
1981 Wyo. Sess. Laws 237 (repealing the Wrongful Death Act from the Probate Code). There is an
absence of wrongful death cases between 1979 and 1981 when the Act was within the probate code
and the legislature is assumed to be aware of the case law when modifying statutes. See Wetering, 682
P.2d at 1061 (stating the legislature is presumed to know existing case law when enacting a related
statute); supra notes 43–66 and accompanying text (discussing the history of case law).
149

See Corkill, 955 P.2d at 443 (“The statute requires every wrongful death action to be brought
by and in the name of the decedent’s personal representative, i.e., the executor or administrator of
the decedent’s estate.”); Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901, 902 (Wyo. 1963) (“[T]he only person
who could bring an action for wrongful death was the personal representative of the deceased, the
executor or administrator of decedent’s estate. We see no reason why these views should now be
altered.”), overruled by Johnson, 231 P.3d at 879; 21 C.J.S. Courts § 202 (2010) (“While a court has
the power to overrule precedent, it should do so only for the most compelling reasons.”).
150

151
Lawson, supra note 2, at 411 (stating the Wyoming Supreme Court has often used the
Probate Code for definitions and provisions in applying the Wrongful Death Act).
152
See, e.g., Corkill, 955 P.2d at 440 (“Knowles is the decedent’s father and the qualified
personal representative of the decedent’s estate.”); Jordan, 541 P.2d at 41 (“[P]laintiff-appellant
was appointed, qualified and is the acting administratrix of the estate . . . and as his personal
representative, brought this action for his wrongful death.”); Coliseum Motor Co., 3 P.2d at 105
(Wyo. 1931) (“This action was brought by . . . [the] administratrix of the estate.”).
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In disregarding the Probate Code’s well-defined provision for determining
a personal representative and merely suggesting it may provide guidance, the
majority turned once predictable outcomes into open questions, thus subjecting
practitioners to a court’s unpredictable discretion.153 Previously in Wyoming, a
court not sitting in probate lacked authority to appoint a personal representative
for the purpose of bringing a wrongful death action.154 In Butler v. Halstead
the court expressly held certain provisions of Wyoming’s Probate Code control
aspects of a wrongful death action.155 Justice Hill’s dissent in Johnson appropriately
addressed the long history of holdings in Wyoming, stating the court has always
interpreted the wrongful death statute to rely on the Probate Code in appointing
a personal representative.156 By overruling the court’s prior decisions, the Johnson
majority created vagueness, uncertainty, and varying interpretations, which run
contrary to the court’s own rules of statutory construction.157

Challenges and Contention
Isolating the wrongful death statutes from the Probate Code potentially creates
additional judicial proceedings and conflicts between individuals supposedly
representing the same interests.158 In appointing a representative without using
objective criteria, a court’s decision will be more susceptible to challenges by other
153
See Payne v. Tennesee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the preferred course
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of
the judicial process.”); Alpine Lumber Co. v. Capital W. Nat’l Bank, 231 P.3d 869, 873 (Wyo.
2010) (stating that courts should avoid overturning established case law interpreting a statute as it
essentially changes the statute, which is the province of the legislature, not the judiciary); Connors,
supra note 125, at 688 (“Stare decisis fosters the related aims of predictability, notice, perceived
legitimacy, and fairness, because it provides that like cases will be treated alike.”).

See, e.g., Corkill, 955 P.2d at 443 (Wyo. 1998) (equating the wrongful death’s personal
representative to the executor or administrator of the decedent’s estate); Bircher, 378 P.2d at 903
(“[T]here is no authority in this State either by statute or decision whereby a district court, unless
sitting in probate, would be authorized to appoint a father as the personal representative of a
deceased son for the purposes of a death action.”).
154

Butler v. Halstead, 770 P.2d 698, 700 (Wyo. 1989) (“[T]he persons for whose benefit
a wrongful death action is brought are all of those persons identified in § 2-4-201 [of the
Probate Code].”).
155

156

In re Estate of Johnson, 231 P.3d 873, 882 (Wyo. 2010) (Hill, J., dissenting).

See Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Wyo. 1992) (stating courts should follow precedent
as it promotes reliability, predictability, consistency, and integrity of the judicial process); Bircher, 378
P.2d at 902 (declining to discuss the plaintiff ’s argument that the Wrongful Death Act’s “personal
representative” has a broader definition than the Probate Code’s, and stating previous opinions
already settled the issue); Person, supra note 128, at 566; supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text
(explaining the Probate Code’s provisions provide structure to the wrongful death statutes).
157

158
See Speiser et al., supra note 16, § 15:6 (discussing the importance of a court process
appointing personal representatives to minimize family disputes and complications as well as
provide certainty and promote judicial efficiency); infra notes 159–65 and accompanying text.
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possible representatives as well as by defendants attempting to defeat the action
based on standing.159 Absent a specific process for appointing a representative to
bring a wrongful death action, this decision increases litigation by permitting
more challenges to appointments, ultimately to the detriment of those harmed
by the wrongful death.160 In Johnson, for example, the father failed to present
reasons why he should have priority over the decedent’s wife in a wrongful death
claim, yet the court remanded the case simply because it was brought as a probate
action.161 The purpose of a wrongful death action is, first and foremost, to benefit
the decedent’s dependents, for which the Probate Code provides objective criteria
for appointment and safeguards their interests.162 Justices Hill and Golden, in
their dissent, appropriately concluded the court should have accepted the probate
court as the appropriate venue and remanded the case, ordering the lower court
to follow the Probate Code’s procedures by appointing the wife as the personal
representative.163 In remanding the case, the Johnson majority warned against
appointing a personal representative on a first-come, first-served basis, yet it

See Tanner v. King, 157 A.2d 643, 644 (N.H. 1960) (holding the lack of a proper plaintiff
as required by the statute precluded the court from maintaining the action); Henkel v. Hood, 156
P.2d 790, 792 (N.M. 1945) (“It is incidental that a ‘personal representative’ . . . is named to bring
suit. It is not because this would fall within his duties as such, but because someone must be named
and our Legislature has fixed upon such a person as the one to sue.”); David K. Deitrich, Florida’s
Wrongful Death Law: Time for a Change, 18 U. Fla. L. Rev. 637, 645 (1966) (“[S]ome sort of
priority must be established to determine which beneficiary can sue.”).
159

160
See Connors, supra note 125, at 688 (“[S]tare decisis . . . reduces the amount of research and
analysis required in cases analogous to cases the Court has ruled on before.”); supra notes 153–57
and accompanying text. In an article discussing the deficiencies of Florida’s statutes addressing
wrongful death, the author suggests wrongful death actions should be brought as a single action by
the personal representative. Deitrich, supra note 159, at 645. The author explains a model act issued
by Harvard contained provisions including a priority system among the beneficiaries and allowing
secondary beneficiaries to bring an action as long as the primary beneficiary is given notice. Id.
161

Johnson, 231 P.3d at 881.

See id. at 883 (Hill, J., dissenting) (citing 22A Am. Jur. 2d Death § 81 (2003)); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. §§ 2-4-201 (specifying a priority list of relatives of the deceased entitled to administer), -203
(defining exceptions to those entitled to administer by reason of incompetence), -205 (describing
how to petition the court for appointment as administrator), -206 (allowing interested parties to
contest and oppose a petition for appointment), 2-7-205 (2010) (requiring notice of administration
of estates to the surviving spouse and all heirs at law of the decedent).
162

163
Johnson, 231 P.3d at 883; see Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 42 (Wyo. 1975)
(“[T]he administrator or executor [of the estate as appointed under the probate code] must bring
the action.”), overruled by Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984), as recognized in Johnson,
231 P.3d at 879; Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901, 902–03 (Wyo. 1963) (“[T]here is no authority in
this State either by statute or decision whereby a district court, unless sitting in probate, would be
authorized to appoint a father as the personal representative of a deceased son for the purposes of
a death action.”), overruled by Johnson, 231 P.3d at 879; supra notes 43–66 and accompanying text
(discussing relevant Wyoming case law).
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effectively sanctioned a race to the courthouse by no longer requiring the Probate
Code to control the appointment process in a wrongful death action, failing to
hold courts accountable to the decedent’s most direct surviving dependents.164

Other States’ Wrongful Death Statutes and Case Law
The majority’s decision in the Johnson case is inapposite to other states’ case
law directly addressing this issue and contradicts the consistent interpretation
of similarly-worded statutes created to serve a similar purpose.165 Most of the
country’s wrongful death statutes share similar language with Wyoming’s,
requiring a personal representative to bring the action.166 Decisions from these
jurisdictions are instructive, as courts have consistently interpreted the term
“personal representative” to refer to the representative of the decedent’s estate.167
While some states explicitly reference their probate code or estate statutes, in
the absence of a definition or appointment criteria, courts and practitioners have
traditionally applied the state’s probate code to fill in the blanks.168 Wyoming,

Johnson, 231 P.3d at 881 (majority opinion); see Frederick Davis, Wrongful Death, 1973
Wash. U. L. Q. 327, 338 (1973). Davis calls the original approach of requiring the personal
representative of the deceased to bring a wrongful death action “simple and direct” and question the
decision of some jurisdictions to allow alternative plaintiffs:
164

It is not altogether clear what policy considerations dictated a departure from the
traditional approach. . . . Whatever the reason for the changes, however, they have
taken place in a number of jurisdictions, and in every case the [determining who
has standing to bring a wrongful death action] which [was] so simply and directly
disposed of by the original [approach, has] become more complicated.
Davis, supra, at 338.
See, e.g., Bennett v. Nicholas, 250 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (“[A] wrongfuldeath action can only be brought by the estate’s lawful representative, either the executor or
administrator.”); Luckey v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 219 N.W. 802, 804 (Neb. 1928) (“The
administrator of the deceased employee’s estate . . . is the ‘personal representative.’”); Henkel v.
Hood, 156 P.2d 790, 794 (N.M. 1945) (Bickley, J., concurring specially) (“When the Legislature
employed the phrase ‘personal representative’ they meant executor or administrator of the estate
of the deceased.”); see supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text (discussing other states’ wrongful
death cases).
165

166
See, e.g., D.C. Code § 16-2702 (2010) (specifying a wrongful death action “shall be
brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person”); Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 411.130 (West 2010) (“[A wrongful death] action shall be prosecuted by the personal
representative of the deceased.”); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-810 (2010) (“Every such action . . . shall be
brought by and in the name of the person’s personal representative.”); W. Va. Code Ann. § 55-7-6
(2010) (using the phrase “such personal representative”); see supra notes 67–75 and accompanying
text (reviewing other states’ statutes with language similar to Wyoming’s).

See James E. Goldie, Comment, The Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute, 35 Ark. L. Rev.
294, 294 (1981) (“Generally, the suit is brought in the name of the personal representative of the
decedent’s estate on behalf of those beneficiaries entitled to damages.”).
167

See, e.g., In re Estate of Hutman, 705 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(“[T]he determination of who becomes a special administrator does not rest solely upon who wins
the proverbial race to the courthouse. Rather, the person chosen must also be qualified under the
168
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however, is the first state to leave the appointment of the personal representative
in a wrongful death action up to the broad discretion of a district court, without
providing statutory guidance or benefiting from established case law.169 The
decision in Johnson creates a legal anomaly in Wyoming, as Wyoming is now the
first state to disassociate the “personal representative” in a wrongful death action
from the administrator or executor of the decedent’s estate, based solely on a new
interpretation of an old statute.170 Instead, the Johnson court should have followed
its precedent and the pervasive legal interpretation of these other states in keeping
the appointment of a personal representative firmly tethered to the Probate
Code’s provisions.171

Conclusion
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s holding in In re Estate of Johnson contradicts
legislative intent and reverses years of case history by divorcing the Probate
Code’s criteria for appointing personal representatives from wrongful death
actions.172 Wyoming’s legislative history and case law demonstrate the Probate
Code is meant to complement the Wrongful Death Act, regardless of the Act’s
location in the Wyoming code.173 Furthermore, previous decisions provided a
clear roadmap upon which practitioners can no longer rely.174 The Johnson court’s

[Probate Code].”); Chavez v. Regents of Univ. of New Mexico, 711 P.2d 883, 886 (N.M. 1985)
(“‘Personal representative’ is not defined by either the Tort Claims Act or the Wrongful Death Act.
A statutory definition of the term may be found, however, in the Probate Code.”).
See Dominguez v. Rogers, 673 P.2d 1338, 1341 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (“[New Mexico’s
wrongful death statute] clearly names a nominal party as the person who must bring the wrongful
death action on behalf of all the individual statutory beneficiaries.”).
169

See In re Estate of Johnson, 231 P.3d 873, 879–80 (Wyo. 2010) (overruling Bircher based
on the lack of legislative direction expressly written into the Wrongful Death Act); supra notes
43–86 and accompanying text (surveying other jurisdictions’ treatment of wrongful death actions
and statutes).
170

171
See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32 (2005) (“Considerations of stare decisis are
particularly forceful in the area of statutory construction, especially when a unanimous interpretation
of a statute has been accepted as settled law for several decades.”); Dunnegan v. Laramie Cnty.
Comm’rs, 852 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Wyo.
1992) (stating courts should depart from precedent to prevent the perpetuation of error and “to
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law”)); supra notes 43–85 and accompanying text (examining
other states’ wrongful death statutes and cases).

See supra notes 13–86 and accompanying text (detailing Wyoming’s wrongful death
statutes’ legislative history and history of related cases).
172

173
See supra notes 127–47 and accompanying text (contending the court should not use the
location of the statutes within the Wyoming Code to infer legislative intent).
174

See supra notes 148–57 and accompanying text (examining previous Wyoming decisions).
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decision creates a new class of civil-action personal representatives appointed at
the broad discretion of the court—opening the door to unpredictability—where
the Probate Code once provided structure.175
The Probate Code provides the best process for appointing personal
representatives.176 Without overriding established exceptions, it should continue
to control the definition and appointment process of the representative to bring
a wrongful death action.177 The absence of relationship priority and a notice
requirement will only lead to increased litigation and legal wrangling.178 Until the
legislature amends the Wrongful Death Act, this decision provides little incentive
for a petitioner to inform other potential representatives of his or her actions and
even less to prevent petitioners from racing to the courthouse.179

175
See supra notes 158–64 and accompanying text (showing how the probate code’s provisions
and earlier decisions incorporating them provided structure and predictable outcomes).
176

See supra notes 158–64 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text (using the procedural history of the Johnson
case as an example of the problem in not applying the probate code when appointing the personal
representative in a wrongful death action).
177

178

See supra notes 153–64 and accompanying text.

179

See supra notes 153–64 and accompanying text.
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